Showing posts with label Cognition. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Cognition. Show all posts

Sunday, April 5, 2015

Paper Review: A Quantum Information Retrieval Approach to Memory

#Title#
A Quantum Information Retrieval Approach to Memory

#Authors#
Kirsty Kitto, Peter Bruza, Liane Gabora

#Venue#
Neural Networks (IJCNN), The 2012 International Joint Conference on

#DOI#
DOI: 10.1109/IJCNN.2012.6252492

#Abstract#
Abstract—As computers approach the physical limits of in- formation storable in memory, new methods will be needed to further improve information storage and retrieval. We propose a quantum inspired vector based approach, which offers a contextually dependent mapping from the subsymbolic to the symbolic representations of information. If implemented computationally, this approach would provide exceptionally high density of information storage, without the traditionally required physical increase in storage capacity. The approach is inspired by the structure of human memory and incorporates elements of Gaerdenfors’ Conceptual Space approach and Humphreys et al.’s matrix model of memory.

#Comments#
This paper detail's Bruza, Kitto and Gabora's matrix model of memory.  Peter Bruza is also a colleague of mine at QUT. :-)

The key components I find interesting are the relationship between symbolic and subsymbolic levels, and its movement towards a distributed overlaid model of memory, that causes excitations in related symbolic entities/terms.  The matrix notation allows for a representation of context as a matrix of features, which via tensor product formalism,  allows for memory to be a distributed process, with activations of related terms.

This is of interest to me, as we can start to utilise visual features in a computational model of subsymbolic components contributing to memory recall via similar inputs of features.

While this is strongly related to an NN associated matrix approach, it makes the relationships between the components explicit, and is thus a candidate as a cognitive model of priming in expert elicitation sessions.  This approach can then be used to modulate user interfaces in virtual world elicitation systems.

#ImportantRefs#

Monday, January 12, 2015

Review: Presence and Memory: Immersive Virtual Reality Effects on Cued Recall

#Title#
Presence and Memory: Immersive Virtual Reality Effects on Cued Recall

#Authors#
Jakki Bailey, Jeremy N. Bailenson, Andrea Stevenson Won, June Flora and K. Carrie Armel

#Venue#
Stanford Tech Report - only Preliminary Results

#DOI#
http://vhil.stanford.edu/pubs/2012/bailey-ispr-presence-memory.pdf

#Abstract#
Presence, the psychological experience of “being there,” is an important construct to consider when investigating the impact of mediated experiences on cognition. Though several studies have investigated the influence of presence on the memory of virtual environments (i.e. recalling virtual objects), few have tested how presence impacts memory on subsequent tasks in the physical world. Thirty-three male and female college students were exposed to a pro-environmental message in an immersive virtual environment. After the virtual reality treatment, they completed a memory task in the physical world regarding pro-environmental principles. Results showed a significant negative association between levels of reported presence in the virtual world and the number of correct water conservation examples remembered in the physical world. These findings suggest that media technology that induces presence can influence an individual’s ability to remember information in the physical world. Possible theoretical explanations of how presence may negatively impact cognition are presented.

#Comments#

Here they seek to relate a specific component of VW to memory, viz., presence or subjective levels of being there, with memory recall in cueing experiments.

They use a nVisor SX111 HMD (NVIS, Reston, VA) with a resolution of 2056 x 1024 and a refresh rate of 120 frames per second to perform the work, framerate is very high compared to Oculus, which may improve presence?  Need to keep this in mind.

Experiment context is that the task involved an environmental narrative, so emotional resonance with such a concept could be a factor here as well.  Does it work the same with other more humdrum narratives?

They also look at free recall and cued recall, so the memory tests are of a different type in each case to cover possibly differing memory processes.

Useful presence scale for assessing level of presence: "A five- item scaled was adapted from presence scales used in previous studies (Bailenson and Yee, 2007; Ahn & Bailenson, 2011; Nowak & Biocca, 2003)."

Note they get a NEGATIVE correlation with memory and presence (n=33).  This needs to be considered for my experiments.  It would be interesting to see if a comparison with desktop levels of presence will map to my other results with Unity and Metasonic?!?!?

Negative correlation is potentially explained by:

1. Vivid inputs from VW could drain cognitive capacity to remember items.
2. Arousal - high levels of emotion - limit memory tasks.
3. People who report high levels of presence actually remember things using different processes, and so are actually a different subject group, so could be a confounding factor that needs to be controlled.
4. Only correlational experiment, no details on causation, so needs further work.

An interesting result, bring out many research questions to answer on the relationship of VW elements with cognitive processes.

#ImportantRefs#

Lin, Duh, Parker, Abi-Rached, & Furness, 2002
Mania & Chalmers, 2001
Dinh, Walker, Song, Kobayashi, and Hodges 1999 

Saturday, May 31, 2014

Paper Review: Learning to Manipulate and Categorize in Human and Artificial Agents

#Title#
Learning to Manipulate and Categorize in Human and Artificial Agents

#Authors#
Giuseppe Morlino, Claudia Gianelli, Anna M. Borghi, Stefano Nolfia

#Venue#
Cognitive Science (2014) 1–26

#DOI#
DOI: 10.1111/cogs.12130

#Abstract#
This study investigates the acquisition of integrated object manipulation and categorization abilities through a series of experiments in which human adults and artificial agents were asked to learn to manipulate two-dimensional objects that varied in shape, color, weight, and color intensity. The analysis of the obtained results and the comparison of the behavior displayed by human and artificial agents allowed us to identify the key role played by features affecting the agent/environment  interaction, the relation between category and action development, and the role of cognitive biases originating from previous knowledge.

#Comments#
The paper looks at issues in the effect of action on categorisation.  They present that categorisation is grounded in in the sensorimotor system, according to present experiments and theory.  And again suggest the central role of action in cognition.

They also look at the issues around how categories enable the flexible usage of objects, and how the grasping of objects changes according to the tasks needed, as per the classic idea of affordances by Gibson (1979).

Important quote: "Affordances are proposed to be the product of the conjunction, in the brain, of repeated visuomotor experiences." Probably a no-brainer to the design community, but important to me, as I need to see this generalise to virtual worlds.  It should be noted that the systems used in this experiment were synthetic, so the effects should generalise to a virtual world, as it is simply shapes and colours with physical properties.  However, there is a history of visual search research with simple shapes not generalising to real images.  This must be considered in any assumptions of efficacy in virtual world simulations.

The experiments involved the manipulation of 2D objects on the screen with a mouse pointer in placing and shaking tasks.   The weight of the objects is aligned with categories and some of the categories are also based on colour, blinking and shape.  The humans (20) were compared to neural network agents.

"The results indicated the discriminative features affecting the agent environment interaction such as weight facilitate the acquisition of the required categorisation abilities with respect to alternative features that are equally informative but that do not affect the outcome of the agent actions."  This leads them to the conclusion that the categorisation for both humans and agents, not withstanding any other factors, is affected by the embodiment of the activity; weight required interaction, not just observation.

The results showed support for a model whereby the interaction with light vs heavy objects produces categories far more effectively than other factors.  Embodied action thus has a great affect on categorisation, whether it affects every category is still uncertain, as the other visual effects (from grounded cognitive affects) still caused categories to form, just not as soon in the training.

They consider this to contribute to a STRONG position of embodiment being central to the creation of categories, and not just being a more peripheral contributor.

They also note a shape effect with humans, ie. they used a curvilinear path with circles, and a rectilinear path with square.  Thus previous memories of the objects influenced their actions and thus the categories.

They also note that the categories are from an interaction of the agent with the environment, and not so from top-down or bottom-up processes exclusively, not overgeneralised or fine granularity categories, but as a dynamic process between agent and environment.

While this is categorisation, and not a memory task, one still has to wonder, for my work, if the memory of a process will be much more enhanced by embodied interactions, and not just visual interactions alone.  One could hypothesise that if the category is more strongly created with embodied action, then the memory of that category (if it maps to say activity specifications) then should be stronger on acting it out.  So an Occulus and Kinect space should measurably work better in process memory tasks than a pure visual space; with both working better than a simple interview.

Something to think about I guess.

#ImportantRefs#

Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Paper Review: Aspects of situated cognition in embodied numerosity: the case of finger counting

#Title#
Aspects of situated cognition in embodied numerosity: the case of finger counting

#Authors#
Mirjam Wasner, Korbinian Moeller, Martin H. Fischer, Hans-Christoph Nuerk

#Venue#
Cognitive Processing, Springer Verlag

#DOI#
DOI 10.1007/s10339-014-0599-z

#Abstract#
Numerical cognitions such as spatial-numerical associations have been observed to be influenced by
grounded, embodied and situated factors. For the case of finger counting, grounded and embodied influences have been reported. However, situated influences, e.g., that reported counting habits change with perception and action within a given situation, have not been systematically examined. To pursue the issue of situatedness of reported finger-counting habits, 458 participants were tested in three separate groups: (1) spontaneous condition: counting with both hands available, (2) perceptual condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers (3) perceptual and proprioceptive condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers and with busy dominant hand.  Report of typical counting habits differed strongly between the three conditions. 28 % reported to start counting with the left hand in the spontaneous counting condition (1),
54 % in the perceptual condition (2) and 62 % in the perceptual and proprioceptive condition (3). Additionally, all participants in the spontaneous counting group showed a symmetry-based counting pattern (with the thumb as number 6), while in the two other groups, a considerable Numerical cognitions such as spatial-numerical associations have been observed to be influenced by
grounded, embodied and situated factors. For the case of finger counting, grounded and embodied influences have been reported. However, situated influences, e.g., that reported counting habits change with perception and action within a given situation, have not been systematically examined. To pursue the issue of situatedness of reported finger-counting habits, 458 participants were tested in three
separate groups: (1) spontaneous condition: counting with both hands available, (2) perceptual condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers (3) perceptual and proprioceptive condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers and with busy dominant hand.  Report of typical counting habits differed strongly between the three conditions. 28 % reported to start counting with the left hand in the spontaneous counting condition (1),
54 % in the perceptual condition (2) and 62 % in the perceptual and proprioceptive condition (3). Additionally, all participants in the spontaneous counting group showed a symmetry-based counting pattern (with the thumb as number 6), while in the two other groups, a considerable

#Comments#

A key insight comes from the statement that all or at least some of our knowledge representations have a situated component drawn from the circumstances of knowledge acquisition.

They suggest that cognitive reps are grounded on the physical properties in the real world - grounded cognitions, as compared to embodied cognition, which is based upon a proprioceptive feedback from our sensor motor systems as they engage with the physical world.  Finally, situated cognition is associated with the tasks being performed, from contextual information presented.

Thus counting has been associated with grounded cognition; the number of objects in the world, but not so far with a situated form of cognition.  Note that large numbers above us in space is consistent from culture to culture, but left to right effects in grounded cognition occur from the written language rules of the culture; left to right or right to left effects due to numerical reading order.

This differentiation is a key issue for my work in virtual worlds, as we can see effects coming from the visual perception of the worlds, in a form of grounded cognition, but in the case of desktop virtual worlds, we can only have a mediated experience of the world, so key situated cognition paths in our brains are not engaged due to lack of sensory motor feedback.

This is evidence of a layering of the cognitive effects of VWs on people, due to levels of immersion.  Thus even with Kinect based interfaces etc., unless there is haptic feedback, we will lack a lot of the information required to make a full recall of information available from previous experiences of the task.

So does this indicate that the knowledge is compartmentalised into the various senses, with some relationships in between?  What would change in our cognition when moving from a desktop world, to an embodied world.  The idea is that the sensory motor component is strongly related to the task information; ie. you have access to this memory when you perform the task with your body.

This may explain why we cannot articulate verbally our work practices without the use of our bodies to prompt recall, even with a visual representation, we need embodiment and task context to fully activate all recall; ie. a physical role-play.

Is there another level, the differentiation between real-context and roleplaying context, the so-called suspension of disbelief, where we think the representation is real, and not a synthetic representation?

Thus the major contribution of the paper is to note the influence of task context effects on the finger counting process.  So for me, the question is whether this effect continues into complex work environment tasks in processes.

So, in an experiment, we can hypothesise that for a memory test, the use of an immersive system (Occulus) will produce different results to a desktop screen virtual world.  We expect that the task specified will be influenced by the part of the body used in the experiment.  This could be an important concept to explore with memory and immersive virtual worlds.

#ImportantRefs#

Loetscher T, Schwarz U, Schubiger M, Brugger P (2008) Head turns
bias the brain’s random number generator. Curr Biol 18(2):R60–
R62