Tuesday, May 13, 2014

Paper Review: Aspects of situated cognition in embodied numerosity: the case of finger counting

#Title#
Aspects of situated cognition in embodied numerosity: the case of finger counting

#Authors#
Mirjam Wasner, Korbinian Moeller, Martin H. Fischer, Hans-Christoph Nuerk

#Venue#
Cognitive Processing, Springer Verlag

#DOI#
DOI 10.1007/s10339-014-0599-z

#Abstract#
Numerical cognitions such as spatial-numerical associations have been observed to be influenced by
grounded, embodied and situated factors. For the case of finger counting, grounded and embodied influences have been reported. However, situated influences, e.g., that reported counting habits change with perception and action within a given situation, have not been systematically examined. To pursue the issue of situatedness of reported finger-counting habits, 458 participants were tested in three separate groups: (1) spontaneous condition: counting with both hands available, (2) perceptual condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers (3) perceptual and proprioceptive condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers and with busy dominant hand.  Report of typical counting habits differed strongly between the three conditions. 28 % reported to start counting with the left hand in the spontaneous counting condition (1),
54 % in the perceptual condition (2) and 62 % in the perceptual and proprioceptive condition (3). Additionally, all participants in the spontaneous counting group showed a symmetry-based counting pattern (with the thumb as number 6), while in the two other groups, a considerable Numerical cognitions such as spatial-numerical associations have been observed to be influenced by
grounded, embodied and situated factors. For the case of finger counting, grounded and embodied influences have been reported. However, situated influences, e.g., that reported counting habits change with perception and action within a given situation, have not been systematically examined. To pursue the issue of situatedness of reported finger-counting habits, 458 participants were tested in three
separate groups: (1) spontaneous condition: counting with both hands available, (2) perceptual condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers (3) perceptual and proprioceptive condition: counting with horizontal (left-to-right) perceptual arrangement of fingers and with busy dominant hand.  Report of typical counting habits differed strongly between the three conditions. 28 % reported to start counting with the left hand in the spontaneous counting condition (1),
54 % in the perceptual condition (2) and 62 % in the perceptual and proprioceptive condition (3). Additionally, all participants in the spontaneous counting group showed a symmetry-based counting pattern (with the thumb as number 6), while in the two other groups, a considerable

#Comments#

A key insight comes from the statement that all or at least some of our knowledge representations have a situated component drawn from the circumstances of knowledge acquisition.

They suggest that cognitive reps are grounded on the physical properties in the real world - grounded cognitions, as compared to embodied cognition, which is based upon a proprioceptive feedback from our sensor motor systems as they engage with the physical world.  Finally, situated cognition is associated with the tasks being performed, from contextual information presented.

Thus counting has been associated with grounded cognition; the number of objects in the world, but not so far with a situated form of cognition.  Note that large numbers above us in space is consistent from culture to culture, but left to right effects in grounded cognition occur from the written language rules of the culture; left to right or right to left effects due to numerical reading order.

This differentiation is a key issue for my work in virtual worlds, as we can see effects coming from the visual perception of the worlds, in a form of grounded cognition, but in the case of desktop virtual worlds, we can only have a mediated experience of the world, so key situated cognition paths in our brains are not engaged due to lack of sensory motor feedback.

This is evidence of a layering of the cognitive effects of VWs on people, due to levels of immersion.  Thus even with Kinect based interfaces etc., unless there is haptic feedback, we will lack a lot of the information required to make a full recall of information available from previous experiences of the task.

So does this indicate that the knowledge is compartmentalised into the various senses, with some relationships in between?  What would change in our cognition when moving from a desktop world, to an embodied world.  The idea is that the sensory motor component is strongly related to the task information; ie. you have access to this memory when you perform the task with your body.

This may explain why we cannot articulate verbally our work practices without the use of our bodies to prompt recall, even with a visual representation, we need embodiment and task context to fully activate all recall; ie. a physical role-play.

Is there another level, the differentiation between real-context and roleplaying context, the so-called suspension of disbelief, where we think the representation is real, and not a synthetic representation?

Thus the major contribution of the paper is to note the influence of task context effects on the finger counting process.  So for me, the question is whether this effect continues into complex work environment tasks in processes.

So, in an experiment, we can hypothesise that for a memory test, the use of an immersive system (Occulus) will produce different results to a desktop screen virtual world.  We expect that the task specified will be influenced by the part of the body used in the experiment.  This could be an important concept to explore with memory and immersive virtual worlds.

#ImportantRefs#

Loetscher T, Schwarz U, Schubiger M, Brugger P (2008) Head turns
bias the brain’s random number generator. Curr Biol 18(2):R60–
R62

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